The Philosophical Value of Reflective Endorsement by Robison, Rachel
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Doctoral Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 
March 2018 
The Philosophical Value of Reflective Endorsement 
Rachel Robison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2 
 Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Metaphysics Commons, and the Other 
Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robison, Rachel, "The Philosophical Value of Reflective Endorsement" (2018). Doctoral Dissertations. 
1190. 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/1190 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations Dissertations and Theses
2018
The Philosophical Value of Reflective Endorsement
Rachel Robison
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2







































































We	view	other	desires	instead	as	reflecting	our	commitments,	as	providing	genuine	reasons	for	action.		Call	the	third	corollary	the	‘Lexical	Ordering	Thesis’	(LOT):	LEXICAL	ORDERING	THESIS:		Reasons	for	action	are	lexically	ordered	as	follows:	a. 	Reasons	for	action	related	to	our	practical	identity	qua	moral	agents	always	take	priority	over	our	other	reasons	for	action.			b. 	Other	reasons	for	action	are	ordered	by	how	central	the	specific	practical	identities	related	to	such	reasons	are	for	our	lives.			Some	reasons	for	action	are	only	prima	facie	obligatory.		Others	count	as	reasons	we	have	all	things	considered.	We	regard	some	reasons	for	action	as	overriding.		LOT	explains	why	this	is	the	case.		Our	practical	identities	are	lexically	ordered	in	terms	of	how	central	they	are	to	our	sense	of	identity,	which	is	in	turn	explained	by	what	we	endorse.		For	Korsgaard,	our	most	fundamental	practical	identity	is	our	humanity,	and	it	is	this	identity	that	gives	rise	to	our	specific	moral	obligations.		As	a	result,	we	are	unconditionally	committed	to	morality.		We	have	other	practical	identities,	however,	that,	while	more	contingent,	are	conceptions	of	ourselves	to	which	we	are	deeply	committed.	These	might	include	our	identities	as	parents,	members	of	certain	religions,	and	so	on.		Other	practical	identities	are	less	fundamental.		For	example,	someone	might	value	being	a	soccer	player,	but	they	would	easily	give	it	up	if	it	conflicted	with	a	practical	identity	that	they	valued	more.				 In	the	remainder	of	this	chapter,	my	argument	proceeds	as	follows.		First,	in	Section	II,	I	discuss	a	standard	objection	to	constructivism	raised	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau,	which	I	apply	to	Korsgaard’s	own	position.		Second,	in	Sections	III-IV,	I	will	argue	that	it	is	Korsgaard’s	commitment	to	reflective	endorsement	in	particular	that	makes	it	vulnerable	to	both	horns	of	the	dilemma	raised	for	a	more	general	account	
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of	constructivism	posed	by	Shafer-Landau.		I	will	show	how	her	analysis	of	both	non-moral	and	moral	practical	identities	ultimately	fails	to	satisfy	her	own	specified	criteria	for	an	adequate	solution	to	the	Normative	Problem.	Third	and	lastly,	in	Section	V,	I	raise	an	objection	to	Korsgaard’s	overall	approach	in	terms	of	her	appeal	to	the	idea	of	reflective	endorsement	in	general.			 	


















































































































The	Transparency	of	Caring	Critique	Frankfurt’s	account	of	caring	puts	each	individual	in	a	privileged	position	with	regard	to	knowledge	pertaining	to	what	they	care	about.		In	this	section,	I	will	argue	that	the	level	of	privilege	we	are	afforded	is	unwarranted.		I	take	Frankfurt	to	be	committed	to	all	of	the	following	epistemic	claims:	1. An	agent	can’t	care	about	something	without	knowing	that	they	care	about	it.		2. An	agent	can’t	be	wrong	in	the	judgment	that	they	care	about	something.	3. An	agent	can’t	be	wrong	in	their	assessment	that	they	don’t	care	about	something.	The	reason	that	an	agent	has	this	kind	of	infallibility	on	Frankfurt’s	account	is	that	caring	is	a	state	that	is	actually	constructed	by	an	internal	process	performed	by	an	agent.		It	requires	reflection	on	and	avowal	of	one’s	attitude’s	toward	the	subjects	of	caring.		If	the	agent	performs	the	process,	the	agent,	by	definition,	cares.		I	will	argue	that	1-3	are	counterintuitive.	
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autonomously	when	she	affirms	the	principle	that	wearing	her	hijab	is	consistent	with	deeply	held	values	that	she	has	endorsed.		Emboldened	by	her	reflection,	she	puts	the	hijab	on	once	more	when	she	wakes	in	the	morning.		Her	running	sense	of	self,	established	by	her	continued	reflective	endorsement	of	the	values	that	matter	to	her,	motivates	her	to	behave	in	similar	ways	in	the	future.		For	Friedman,	this	kind	of	behavior	is	normatively	superior	to	behavior	that	is	not	motivated	by	reflective	endorsement	or	that	is	less	motivated	by	endorsement.		 Something	similar	is	going	on	in	the	case	of	Korsgaard.		When	we	reflect	on	what	really	matters	to	us,	we	endorse	certain	practical	identities,	and	those	practical	identities	provide	motivations	that	are	genuinely	normative	to	engage	in	behaviors	that	are	mandated	by	those	identities.				 We	have	also	seen,	especially	in	our	discussion	of	Gibbard,	that	reflective	endorsement	is	just	one	source	of	motivation.		Its	proponents	seem	to	suggest	that	endorsement	is	normatively	superior	to	other	forms	of	motivation.		For	Friedman,	it	is	because	we	are	on	the	far	end	of	the	autonomy	spectrum	when	we	engage	in	endorsement.		For	Korsgaard,	it	is	because	we	are	acting	on	reasons	that	are	genuinely	normative	for	us	when	we	do	so.		For	Frankfurt,	it	is	because	we	are	expressing	our	wills—exhibiting	our	personhood,	when	we	take	an	evaluative	stance	toward	our	own	inner	states.		 I’ll	attempt	to	demonstrate	that	motivation	that	comes	from	endorsement	is	not	properly	understood	as	superior	and	should	not,	in	many	cases,	be	granted	any	sort	of	normative	authority.	To	make	this	case,	I’ll	first	outline	just	a	few	sources	of	motivation	that	are	not	instances	of	endorsement.		I’ll	consider	cases	that	are	
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motivated	in	the	ways	I	have	described	and	compare	them	to	cases	in	which	behavior	is	motivated	by	endorsement.		I’ll	consider	behavior	of	each	of	the	following	types:				1. Instinctual	Behavior	2. Behavior	that	results	from	habituation	3. Behavior	that	results	from	shaming	First,	I’ll	provide	a	sense	of	what	I	have	in	mind	in	each	case.	First,	let’s	consider	instinctual	behavior.		This	is	the	kind	of	behavior	that	we	are,	essentially,	hardwired	to	engage	in.		For	example,	if	I	notice	that	my	child	has	tripped	and	is	beginning	to	fall,	I	will,	without	thinking,	reach	to	catch	him.		 The	second	type	is	behavior	that	has	been	habituated.		These	types	of	behaviors	are	often	those	in	which	we	have	been	socialized	to	engage.	Gibbard	calls	motivation	of	this	type	motivation	on	norms	that	have	been	internalized.	These	behaviors	might	include	things	like	maintaining	a	certain	social	distance	from	others,	holding	the	door	open	for	others	as	they	enter	public	places,	and	so	on.			 Habituated	behaviors	can	also	be	more	complex.	For	example,	imagine	a	mother,	Sarah,	who	has	internalized	appropriate	parenting	behaviors	based	on	the	way	that	she	was	raised.		When	she	was	a	child,	her	mother	had	a	swear	jar	that	everyone	contributed	to	when	they	uttered	a	profanity.		Sarah	has	one	as	well.		Sarah’s	mother	took	her	children	to	church	every	Sunday.		Sarah	does	the	same	thing	with	her	children.		She	has	not	reflected	on	the	behavior,	she	has	simply	assumed,	without	challenge,	that	the	way	that	her	mother	raised	her	was	the	way	that	she	should	raise	her	children.	
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virtuous	and	becoming	habituated	that	the	agent	recognizes	the	connection	between	virtue	and	action.		He	says:		Actions	are	called	just	or	temperate	when	they	are	the	sort	that	a	just	or	temperate	person	would	do.	But	the	just	and	temperate	person	is	not	the	one	who	merely	does	these	actions,	but	the	one	who	also	does	them	in	the	way	in	which	just	or	temperate	people	do	them.108		So,	for	Aristotle,	the	just	or	temperate	person	doesn’t	simply	engage	in	the	appropriate	behavior	given	the	situation.		The	person	has	been	habituated	to	recognize	the	connection	between	the	action	and	the	virtue.		 Similarly,	skillful	endorsement	must	be	more	than	simply	empty	avowal.		An	agent’s	reflective	endorsement	is	adroit	when	they	recognize	the	range	of	behaviors	that	certain	endorsements	entail.		A	tendency	toward	ignorance	or	misinformation	represents	diminished	skill	or,	in	the	more	extreme	cases,	a	lack	of	skill.		 Consider	the	case	of	a	Michelle,	who	professes	to	care	about	the	environment.		Perhaps	this	attitude	was	instilled	in	her	in	a	somewhat	clumsy	way	in	grade	school.		Despite	her	claim	to	care	about	the	environment,	she	engages	in	many	practices	that	have	serious	negative	environmental	impacts.		She	eats	meat,	doesn’t	recycle,	drives	her	car	to	work	rather	than	taking	accessible	public	transportation,	and	allows	her	car	to	idle	while	she	waits	for	her	kids	to	come	out	of	school	so	that	she	can	keep	the	air	conditioning	running	in	the	summer.		Her	behaviors	don’t	actually	bear	out	her	claim	to	care	about	the	environment.				 I’m	not	denying,	here,	that	Michelle	experiences	strong	reactive	attitudes	when	she	introspects	about	the	environment.		She	meets	an	internal	component	for																																																									108	Aristotle,	W.	D.	Ross,	and	Lesley	Brown.	2009.	The	Nicomachean	ethics.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		
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caring.		What	I	am	suggesting	here	is	that	skillful	endorsement	has	external	components	as	well	as	internal	components.		It	is	not	enough	for	the	archer	to	simply	understand	how	to	move	his	body	in	order	to	get	the	arrow	to	fly	in	one	direction	or	another.		If	he	really	wants	to	be	skilled	at	archery,	there	are	other	things	that	he	must	know.		Similarly,	if	a	person	really	cares	about	something,	whether	that	thing	is	a	thing,	a	person,	or	a	practical	identity,	there	is	an	external	obligation	to	become	knowledgeable	about	the	thing	in	question	if	a	person	wants	to	care	well.		 What	I’ve	said	about	people	who	lack	information	also	applies	to	people	who	possess	inaccurate	information.		Let’s	go	back	to	our	example	of	the	woman	in	the	Friedman	chapter	who	desires	to	feed	her	family	and	children	only	healthy	food.		She	mistakenly	comes	to	believe	that	all	and	only	food	that	is	organic	is	healthy	food.		Here,	I	am	reminded	of	a	scene	from	Harold	and	Maude	in	which	Maude	offers	young	Harold	some	champagne.		When	he	informs	her	that	he	doesn’t	drink,	she	replies,	“It’s	alright,	it’s	organic.”		Let’s	imagine	that	our	health	food	minded	mother	reasons	according	to	similar	principles.		Of	course,	not	all	things	that	are	healthy	are	organic,	and	not	all	things	that	are	organic	are	healthy.		If	the	woman	in	this	case	were	to	follow	the	advice	offered	in	the	previous	section	and	reviewed	her	own	past	behaviors,	she	could	do	so	in	more	than	one	way.		The	first	way	is	to	look	at	whether	she	was	always	motivated	by	a	desire	to	feed	her	children	healthy	food.		She	could	also	evaluate	whether	she	has,	in	the	past,	been	the	best	judge	of	what	constituted	healthy	food.		So,	one	point	of	analysis	may	be	not	simply	what	an	agent’s	past	behavior	happened	to	be,	but	also	the	extent	to	which	that	past	behavior	was	
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actually	an	expression	the	values	that	the	agent	claims	to	care	about.		This	is	an	external	condition.				 Should	we,	then,	look	at	our	past	behaviors	themselves,	or	at	the	intentions	behind	our	past	behaviors?	I	think	that	the	answer	is	both.	Sometimes	the	external	world	conspires	against	us	in	the	sense	that	an	action	we	desired	to	be	of	one	type	actually,	in	fact,	turned	out	to	be	a	behavior	of	an	entirely	different	type.		The	woman	intending	to	feed	her	children	healthy	food,	but	being	mistaken	about	what	counts	as	healthy	food	is	a	good	example.		By	contrast,	sometimes	our	actions	are	quite	telling	when	it	comes	to	what	we	actually	care	about,	but	we	our	own	intention	is	not	transparent	to	us.		I	may	act	in	such	and	such	a	way	because	I’m	afraid	of	stepping	outside	my	comfort	zone,	all	the	while	I	am	totally	unaware	that	I	even	have	a	comfort	zone	and	don’t	know	what	it	would	look	like	to	be	outside	of	it.			Reflective	Endorsement	and	Protecting	Against	Hueristics	We	saw	in	the	previous	chapter	that	behavior	that	we	take	ourselves	to	be	endorsing	for	one	reason,	we	might,	in	fact,	be	endorsing	for	different	reasons	altogether.		For	example,	Melinda	might	introspect	and	confirm	to	herself	that	she	is	a	good	student.		She	might	do	this,	even	in	light	of	the	fact	that	it	is	roughly	midway	through	the	semester	and	she	has	entirely	given	up	on	attending	class	regularly.		Instead	of	paying	much	attention	to	her	attendance,	she	focuses	on	her	ability	to	score	decently	well	on	exams	by	simply	searching	the	Internet	for	information	listed	as	weekly	topics	on	the	syllabus.		Why	is	she	capable	of	engaging	in	such	impressive	mental	gymnastics?		It	may	well	be	that	it	is	because	self-serving	heuristics	have	
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come	to	save	the	day,	if	not	with	respect	to	her	grade	at	least	with	respect	to	her	self	esteem.		 Michelle,	a	previously	overweight	person	who	has	been	on	an	exercise	kick	for	years	might	conceive	of	herself	as	overweight.		She	might	discount	the	opinions	of	those	who	tell	her	otherwise	and	may	choose	to	spend	time	with	those	who	confirm	the	negative	image	that	she	has	of	herself.		A	validation	heuristic	might	be	to	blame.		 When	reflective	endorsement	is	adroit,	those	engaging	in	it	are	aware	of	the	possibility	that	the	mind’s	use	of	heuristics	might	masquerade	as	authentic	self-evaluations.		That	such	a	heuristic	is	operative	is	always	a	possibility—serving	as	persistent	local	skeptical	hypothesis.		We	may	never	be	able	to	rule	it	out	entirely,	but,	if	we	want	to	be	skillful,	we	must	keep	the	possibility	in	mind	and	do	what	we	can	to	protect	against	it.		Like	an	archer	making	apt	shots,	the	apt	reflective	endorser	is	familiar	with	their	equipment	and	knows	how	to	protect	against	its	potential	deficiencies.		
Apt	Reflective	Endorsement	Finally,	we	can	paint	a	picture	of	what	it	would	look	like	for	reflective	endorsement	to	be	apt.		Recall	that	an	archer’s	shot	is	apt,	not	simply	under	the	conditions	that	he	or	she	makes	the	shot,	or	simply	under	the	condition	that	the	shot	is	skillful.		In	order	for	the	shot	to	count	as	apt,	the	archer	must	make	the	shot	because	he	or	she	is	skillful.		
	147	
	 Apt	reflective	endorsement	may	look	very	similar.		When	a	person	introspects	aptly,	they	introspect	by	making	use	or	the	best,	most	reliable	information	available	to	them.		If	they	arrive	at	a	position	of	value,	they	must	do	so,	not	as	a	lucky	result	of	useful	heuristics,	but	because	they	are	reflecting	correctly.		
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